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Abstract
The determinants of the regional allocation of transportation and communication investments are anal-
ysed for the twenty-six statistical regions of Turkey for the years 1999 through 2011. A unique regional
GVA series covering this period is constructed for this purpose. We specifically account for the possibility
of dependence between allocation decisions for different infrastructure types. Estimation results strongly
suggest that political bias has been present in the allocation decisions of regional transportation and
communication public investments in Turkey.
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1 Introduction
The contributions of public infrastructure to the growth of economies have been researched
and advocated since the early 1900s. Especially transportation and communication infras-
tructure has drawn much attention. It is also commonly recognized as a stylized fact that
transportation infrastructure forms and strengthens the links between economic areas, facil-
itates the mobility of goods, input factors, human capital, and creates positive externalities
to firms and industries. Communications infrastructure on the other hand, is argued to
play an important role in the “transportation” of information: it reduces the “information
gap” between markets (Carey, 2008), and shape the economic geography by significantly im-
pacting on financial services and capital flows (Dokmeci and Berkoz, 1996) while still being
physically attached to specific locations (Castells et al., 2007). In this regard, transportation
and communication infrastructures are especially relevant in a spatial context. A relevant
topic is the allocation of these types of infrastructure across sub-national regions within a
national economy. This allocation process involves decision makers who take into account
regional and national needs together with region-specific characteristics. Therefore, this
process can be subject to many factors such as geographical, locational, demographic, eco-
nomic, and political attributes of the investment receiving regions. Additionally, the motives
regarding welfare, equality, and efficiency can differ between economies and decision-makers,
presenting heterogeneity in national goals regarding regional policy. Due to this heterogene-
ity, studying the determinants of the regional allocation of public investments is commonly
done by focusing on spatial units within national economies, rather than samples consisting
of countries.
While for many developed countries, research that focuses on the spatial allocation of
government services and/or infrastructure are common, this is not always the case for devel-
oping economies. An example is Turkey, where the regional allocation of infrastructure has
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often been part of political debate, but not been subject to academic research. This may
have been due to the previous unavailability of a sufficiently long time-series data which was
a major data limitation that we tackled in this study: a meticulous data collection process
from fragmented resources allowed us to attain a panel data set that has a time dimension
of 13 years.1 As a result, we have been able to conduct our analyses using a time-series
cross-sectional data set from the twenty-six statistical regions of Turkey through the years
1999-2011, and contribute new evidence to the literature from a previously non-examined
case.
Another novelty that this research presents is the consideration that investments in the
separate infrastructure categories may not be decided independently from one another: we
assume that the allocation decisions of all categories of public capital are made jointly (i.e.
they are all subject to the same resource constraint). Thus, we do not treat the investments in
transportation and communication infrastructure as being independent from the investments
in other types of public capital. This assumption and its relevance to our research is discussed
further in Section 5.
The rest of this study is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a review of the past
literature and elaborates on the motivation of this paper. The concept of political bias in
relation to public capital allocation is discussed in Section 3. An overview of the trends
in regional infrastructure investments in Turkey and the regional governance structure of
the country are reviewed in Section 4. The theoretical framework and how it leads to our
empirical analysis is discussed in Section 5. The data collected is described in Section 6, and
the empirical results are presented in Section 7. Finally, Section 8 presents the concluding
discussion.
1Our models use a maximum of 12 years of observations due to the presence of lagged variables in the estimations.
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2 Motivation and Previous Research
Our point of departure is the stylized fact that transportation and communication public
infrastructure provides positive contribution to an economy through various channels. For
instance, positive impact of public capital investments on economic growth has been observed
in studies by Aschauer (1989a,b), Munnell and Cook (1990); Munnell (1990), Garcia-Mila
and McGuire (1992), Aschauer (2000) for the United States, Leo´n-Gonza´lez and Montolio
(2004) for Spanish provinces, Bom and Ligthart (2008) through meta-analysis, Hamalainen
and Malinen (2011) for Finnish regions, among others.2 Specifically transportation public
capital has been a highly researched infrastructure category in relation to economic growth;
research is done by Stephan (2001) for German and French regions, Cadot et al. (1999) for
French regions, Berechman et al. (2006) for the United States, Montolio and Sole-Olle (2009)
and Cantos et al. (2005) for Spanish provinces who have found a positive relationship between
growth and this type of capital.3 In addition, transportation infrastructure, together with
communication infrastructure, has been found to influence trade performance positively as
shown by Bougheas et al. (1999) for nine core EU and Scandinavian countries, Limao and
Venables (2001) for 103 World Countries, Mart´ınez-Zarzoso and Nowak-Lehmann (2003) for a
sample of 20 EU and Mercosur countries and Chile, Longo and Sekkat (2004) for intra-African
trade, Wu (2007) for Chinese regions, and Celbis et al. (2013) through meta-analysis. It has
also been shown that public investments can benefit an economy through other channels as
well; Altunc and Senturk (2010) find that infrastructural public investments have stimulated
private investments in Turkey between 1980 and 2009, Holtz-Eakin and Lovely (1996) observe
a positive impact of public capital on the expansion of the manufacturing sector in the United
States, and Ding et al. (2008) find that telecommunications infrastructure has played an
important role in regional per-capita income convergence in China from 1986 to 2002.
Population effects have been hypothesized to be present in the realization of public in-
vestments since the early 20th century. In a relatively early study, Hirsch (1959) observed,
2See Romp and De Haan (2007) for a comprehensive survey of the recent literature focusing on this relationship.
3Bhatta and Drennan (2003) provide an extensive survey of the literature focusing on the relationship between public investment
in transportation and economic development.
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contrary to previous findings in the literature suggesting population size is an important
factor, that for a wide range of urban service expenditures, the population size does not
matter but geographical size does. On the other hand, Hansen (1965) reported that for a
sample of Belgian communities, the concentration of population is associated with higher
public investment, while in a country-level panel study, Randolph et al. (1999) find that
factors such as the level of development, urbanization, population density, and labour force
participation have strong implications on per capita spending on infrastructure in trans-
portation and communication. Together with population-related factors, economic variables
have naturally also drawn attention in the literature. This has led to the surging inter-
est in the equity-efficiency preference in the allocation of public infrastructure as defined
in Yamano and Ohkawara (2000) and Castells and Sole-Olle (2005). The equity-efficiency
trade-off is the choice between investing in spatial sections of an economy with relatively
higher productivity for attaining higher national efficiency, and investing into those that are
lagging for achieving regional equity. In this regard, Nijkamp states that
“In the light of economies of scale and scope, there may be a tendency to invest
heavily in central areas, as here in general the expected benefits per unit of in-
vestment and per capita are the highest. Of course, this may be at odds with
spatial equity targets, and therefore it may not be so easy to find a proper bal-
ance between the goals of efficiency and equity in a regional competition context.”
Nijkamp (2000, p.89).
In relation to regional equity goals, the inter-regional infrastructure investment can also be
viewed as a redistributive policy as proposed by Sole-Olle (2011): money is re-allocated
between regions through the regional investment of the funds which, in turn, are collected
through taxes paid by regions.4 Related empirical results vary depending on the economy
and the time period in question. Mizutani and Tanaka (2008) for Japan in 1975-1990, and
Castells and Sole-Olle (2005) for Spain in 1987-1996 observe that relative to the national
4The author distinguishes infrastructure investment redistribution motives into two categories: Tactical and programmatic. In
tactical redistribution few regions receive the benefits, and costs are shared by all regions. On the other hand, programmatic
redistribution specifically aims to withdraw resources from certain regions and redistributes them to others (Sole-Olle, 2011).
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governments, sub-national units value efficiency more. On the other hand, Yamano and
Ohkawara (2000) find that the Japanese central government has adopted a policy of equity
regarding the allocation of public investments between 1970 and 1994 in their study on
forty-seven prefectures.
Despite many such findings that support one another, a wide range of methodological
diversity is still present in studies which focus on the determinants of local public investment.
This heterogeneity is mainly due to differences based on the case-specific attributes of the
economy in focus such as its regional governance structure, the type of public service in
focus, such as transportation, communication, health, security, etc., and the scale of the
investment receiving economy such as a city, region, country, trade union, and so on. We
discuss further in this study how the specific case that we focus shapes our choices regarding
the methodology used in our analyses.
3 Political bias and the allocation of public capital
Aside of the above discussed equity-efficiency trade-off in the distribution of public in-
vestments, political factors have also been attracting some interest. The presence of such
factors may result in a politically biased regional allocation of public capital, which is the
main focus of this paper. We discuss in detail the reasoning, measurement, and inclusion of
a variable expressing political bias in our analyses in Section 5, and elaborate further on the
results we find regarding this possible bias in Section 7. In regard to political factors, Crain
and Oakley (1995, p.15) state that “...public capital decisions are not made in political vac-
uum” and in their study on US states, find that various political and institutional conditions
influence public capital decisions. Similarly, in a study on the regions of France, which has
a very similar regional governance structure to the country of focus in this study5, Cadot
et al. (1999) observe that “influence activities” represented by a political variable have im-
portant implications on the regional allocation of transportation infrastructure. Regarding
the same type of infrastructure, Painter and Bae (2001) point out to a significant influence
5Turkey has been taking the French regional governance system as a model (Gokyurt, 2010).
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of political factors along with demographic and economic determinants in their study on US
states. Similar effects of politics on the spatial allocation of public investment for various
specific cases are demonstrated by Kemmerling and Bodenstein (2006), Busemeyer (2007),
and Kemmerling and Stephan (2008), and specifically in the context of political affiliation of
the investment receiving units to the decision makers, by Costa-I-Font et al. (2003), Castells
and Sole-Olle (2005), Joanis (2011), Sole-Olle (2011), and Zheng et al. (2013). Aside of
the political affiliation of a region to the central government, public investments can also
be seen by decision makers as a way to increase their election probabilities as pointed out
by Nijkamp (2000). Moreover, the political structure of regional administration in an econ-
omy can have various implications on the investment decision process. For example, in a
decentralized context where regions make their own investment decisions, Yu et al. (2011)
find that public investments in neighboring regions play a significant role, pointing out that
spatial dependence may exist if regions behave based on each others’ investment choices.
4 Regional public infrastructure in Turkey
Since the establishment of the Republic of Turkey, regional policy goals have been shaped
by five-year development plans made by the State Planning Organization (SPO) which was
redefined as the “Ministry of Development” in 2011. For consistency, we use the label “SPO”
for this governing body throughout this study.6 Turkey has 26 statistical regions and an
area of 783,562 km2. These twenty-six regions are composed of varying number of provinces
which add-up to a country total of eighty-one.7 Along with the existence of local governing
bodies and the gradual introduction of Regional Development Agencies (RDA’s), the SPO
is currently the principal body of decision concerning public investments.8 Regarding local
governance in Turkey, Lagendijk et al. state that
“...it is important to remember that the current territorial governance structure,
6For a summary of all five-year plans undertaken by the SPO see Keskin and Sungur (2010).
7Table A.1 lists the 26 statistical regions and their NUTS 2 level codes that cover all of Turkey’s territory and Figure A.1
presents their locations.
8For a detailed up-to-date explanation of the role of the SPO in regional policy-making see Ertugal and Dobre (2011).
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based on a division into 81 provinces, primarily serves to carry out basic adminis-
trative tasks under central authority.” (Lagendijk et al., 2009, p.386)
This mechanism of centralized decision making attracts some criticism. For example, Gokyurt
(2010) points out that the approach on the public investment process in Turkey suffers from
an over-focus on central and sectoral points of view, and argues that the low contribution
to public investment decisions by the local level causes inconsistencies between spatial needs
and public investment plans. Moreover, the central authority (SPO), is fully under the au-
thority of the government. This may suggest that existence of a political effect can also be
expected to be valid for Turkey. Such a political effect can potentially play a role, leading
to a political bias as discussed in Section 3 which, in turn, can result in a departure from
the optimum allocation for maximizing country welfare.
Income and public investments have generally had an upward trend in Turkey during
the last decade. Figure 1 shows the trends in the country gross domestic product (GDP)
and transportation and communication public investments (abbreviated as “TPI” in the
figure). An upwards trend for both variables is prominent especially for the period after
2002, which coincides to a post-crisis period and an election of a single-party government.
Figures 2 and 3 plot the trends in the natural logarithms of GVA and public investments in
transportation and communication for the five economically most developed regions (as of
2008) respectively. While for ln GVA, an increasing trend is observable for all five regions,
the investment figures do not present clear trends except for Istanbul receiving the highest
investments for the complete time range. The spatial distribution of transportation and
communication infrastructure stock, GVA, and public investments in transportation and
communication are presented in the maps in Figures A.2 to A.4 for the years 1999 and 2011
in the Appendix.9,10 These figures underline the spatial patterns in the country and suggest
that economic activity, and public investments in transportation and communication tend
to concentrate to certain regions of the country, where obvious differences between 1999 and
9Maps have been drawn using the Stata command spmap written by Pisati (2007). Because the only available shapefile for
the map of Turkey was in NUTS 3 scale, we have aggregated the NUTS 3 regions to NUTS 2 units by using the mergepoly
command written by Picard and Stepner (2012).
10The calculation of the infrastructure index is detailed in Table A.3.
7
2011 are present only for the latter: western and southern regions have received relatively
less investments in 2011 than they did in 1999. This is the case also for several central and
northern regions. However, it is important to note that these maps are snapshots in time
and do not give information regarding any trend.
Figure 1. GVA and public investments in transportation and communication, constant 1998 national
currency (billions), Turkey.
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Figure 2. Regional ln GVA, constant 1998 national currency.
Figure 3. Regional public investments in transportation and communication per capita, constant 1998
national currency.
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5 Theoretical framework and empirical approach
We follow the theoretical framework of Behrman and Craig (1987) as adapted by Castells
and Sole-Olle (2005) and Zheng et al. (2013). According to this approach, a central gov-
ernment that faces budget and production constraints aims to maximize country welfare by
allocating the public investments between regions subject to a trade-off between regional
efficiency and regional equity which is embodied in the linear combination of two variables:
output and population (Castells and Sole-Olle, 2005). This approach suggests that if a
government is only concerned about regional equity, then regional population is the only
characteristic that the government considers in the allocation of public investments. On
the other hand, if the only concern of the government is regional efficiency, then the only
determining factor in the allocation decisions is the regional per-capita output (Castells and
Sole-Olle, 2005). These factors that represent equity and efficiency are included in our model
as the population in region i at time t denoted by Nit, and the regional Gross Value Added
(GVA) per capita denoted by Yit
Nit
respectively where Y denotes the regional GVA.
On the other hand, the allocation process is also affected by the weights on each region
that the government places (Castells and Sole-Olle, 2005; Zheng et al., 2013). These weights
are determined by a set of regional characteristics. Non-uniform weights across regions can
result in a biased allocation process. As discussed in section 3, political factors, especially in
the form of political affiliation, are frequently considered by researchers as a determinant of
public investment allocation. However, the measurement of such political effects are diverse.
Some examples of the political affiliation variables used in the literature are presented in
Table A.2 which demonstrates the large variety of ways that political affiliation is measured
in the literature. The variation is possibly due to the diversity of the political structures and
the regional governance schemes of countries focused. This leaves us some room to construct
our own variable for political affiliation consistent with Turkey’s centralized structure of
territorial governance. In this regard, we introduce a variable to measure the regional political
closeness to the central national government, Pit. The measurement and reasoning of this
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variable is as follows: we argue that the more political weight a region has in the decision-
making processes of the government, the more these decisions can be biased in its favor,
in line with the discussion in Section 3. An obvious influence of a regional economy on
the government is through the individuals that take place in central decision-making. In
Turkey, every region is allocated a fixed number of members of parliament (MP’s) that are
elected into the national assembly. It is also likely that some of these MP’s elected into the
national parliament from a given region are also members of the party or parties that form
the national government. We argue that if the share of the MP’s from a given region i in the
government is relatively high within the total number of MP’s in the parliament from the
same region in a specific year, then a political bias towards this region can be expected in
the allocation of transportation and communication infrastructure. Therefore, we measure
Pit as the share of the MP’s a region has in the central government party (or parties) out
of all it’s MP’s in the parliament11: Pit =
No. of MPit in the gov
′t
no. of MPit
where MPit is the number of
MP’s from region i at time t.
In order to further focus on the tendencies in the literature focusing on public investment
allocation, we present in Table A.4 a sample of factors considered by previous researchers.
This table especially points out the diversity of the factors that are taken into account in
previous studies. We assume this diversity to be the result of the case-specific attributes of
each study. An important observation is that there is not a generally agreed core empirical
specification of a model explaining infrastructure allocation. Table A.4 also shows that
in the literature, the earlier discussed indicators representing the efficiency-equity choice
and region-specific weights are usually taken into account by including variables such as
the productivity of a region, its population, infrastructure stock, previously received public
investments, and political variables, among others.
Regarding the estimation of the aforementioned effects on the allocation process of public
infrastructure in transportation and communication, denoted as Iit, a potential source of
endogeneity can be caused by the fact that transportation and communication public in-
11The measurement of all variables including Pit are detailed in Table A.3.
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vestments, may not be independent from the other types of public investments, as briefly
discussed in Section 1. As these two categories of investment are together part of the total
public investments that a region receives, their regional allocation decisions are expected to
be made jointly. The relationship between these separate investment categories could exist
in two ways: they can be complements or substitutes to a certain degree. Importantly, they
are subject to the same government resource constraint, which suggests interdependence
between these categories. Therefore, the public investments made in all other categories of
infrastructure are included as an endogenous variable in our model (Oi,t).
Castells and Sole-Olle (2005) and Zheng et al. (2013) present a dynamic specification
where a lagged dependent variable is among the explanatory variables.12 This variable
can be seen as the effect of previous policy choices in relation to concepts such as policy
continuity and path dependence. In this regard, Zheng et al. (2013) point out that as
investment projects may take multiple years, and investments made in a given year can
bring further investments in the subsequent years. This argument leads to the motive of
including the investments made in previous years as an endogenous variable. As in Castells
and Sole-Olle (2005) and Zheng et al. (2013), we include into our model a lagged dependent
variable, Ii,t−1 in order to take into account the expectation that investment flows may be
correlated between consecutive time periods. In addition, it is likely that decision makers
observe the information about regional political affiliation from the previous year (Castells
and Sole-Olle, 2005) as opposed to having instant access to this information. Therefore, Pit is
lagged one year in our estimations. On the other hand, information regarding the economic
and demographic variables can be more readily available, as monthly or quarterly estimates
usually exist. Therefore, these variables can be expected to have instant effects on allocation
decisions of policy-makers.13 Other than political factors, there still is a wide range of regional
characteristics that need to be taken into account for controlling the earlier discussed regional
12Unlike the empirical specification of Zheng et al. (2013), our model does not take into account the spatial interdependence of
investments. Elhorst (2011) points out to the many econometric problems in the currently available dynamic spatial panel
data estimators (ML, QML, IV/GMM, and Bayesian MCMC).
13Even though election polls are common, they are made by private companies and results can exhibit great variation between
polling firms. Therefore political tendencies may require some time and consensus to be confirmed, while official information
on the economy and the demography can be more readily available to the decision-makers.
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weights placed by the government on regions. It is highly likely that decision makers take into
account the regional needs by considering the already existing infrastructure within a region
before allocating the infrastructure investments. Not surprisingly, that this is a commonly
considered factor in the literature as shown in Table A.4 as this effect can work in different
ways: relatively higher infrastructure stock that exists in a region can draw investment due to
higher maintenance, upgrading, or extension possibilities while a government with equality
concerns may be less willing to invest further on such a region, directing the investments to
regions with lower levels of infrastructure. We control for the effect of the existing stock of
transportation and communication infrastructure in a region by including the variable Git,
which is an infrastructure stock index constructed using the first principal components of
the natural logarithms of the variables Road density, Hway density, Railway density, Pub.
Pier, Air capacity, and ADSL.14 Instead of including all the infrastructure categories in a
disaggregated manner in the estimations, we use this combined index in order to keep the
consistency with the dependent variable which is itself the combined public investment value
of all these infrastructure categories. Thus, Git measures how deprived or strong a region
was in terms of general transportation and communication infrastructure in a given year.
Another regional attribute that is related to infrastructure is pointed out by Glomm
and Ravikumar (1994, p.1174) who state that “the contribution of infrastructure to private
factor productivity is subject to congestion.” This view is supported by Castells and Sole-Olle
(2005) who state that the utilization level of transport infrastructure stock has consequences
on the services provided by infrastructure. For measuring congestion, Fernald (1999) uses
the total miles driven by trucks and automobiles. We use the vehicle stock per capita in a
region as an indicator of congestion and denote this variable as Vit/Nit. Based on the above
discussion, our core empirical specification takes the following form:
14The definitions and measurements of these variables are presented in Table A.3.
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lnIit = c0 + β1lnIi,t−1 + β2lnOit + β3ln
(
Yit
Nit
)
+ β4lnNit + β5lnPi,t−1
+ β6lnVit + ci + ct + eit
(1)
where c0 is a constant and eit is the error term. As earlier discussed, the allocation of invest-
ments among regions are subject to weights determined by a set of regional characteristics.
These characteristics are assumed to be partly within ci which includes those that vary only
cross-sectionally, and partly within ct which includes those that vary only in time.
Geographical conditions of a region are also argued to affect public infrastructure projects:
Ramcharan (2009) documents that the transport networks of countries with rougher surfaces
are less developed than those with less rough terrain surface. In support of this conclusion,
Martincus et al. (2012, p.11), state that “Roughness imposes severe challenges to devel-
opment and maintenance of transport networks.” Within these lines, we hypothesize that
regional hilliness (or roughness) can either discourage investment, or require more costly
investment projects and increase regional needs. In order to control for this potential geo-
graphical effect, we define a variable that attempts to measure the regional urban hilliness.
We denote this time-invariant variable as Ri and measure it as defined in Table A.3.
Investment decisions may be affected by the electoral cycle as suggested by Castells and
Sole-Olle (2005): when an election is close, the public investment flows may may be subject
to a different decision-making process. We include the variable Et which is the number of
years until the next national election year in order to take into account the effects of the
electoral cycle. In order to further capture the country-wide political structure, we introduce
a single party dummy, St, that takes the value of one if the national government has a non-
coalition single party structure in a given year. This variable is in national scale and does
not present cross-sectional variation. That is to say for all regions, St takes the value of
one for the years in which the national government was consisted of a single party (2003
onwards) and zero for the coalition years 1999 through 2002.
Another potentially relevant regional characteristic is the size of a region; since trans-
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portation and communication infrastructure are distributed through space, larger regions
simply have more room for investment in these infrastructures. We control for the effect of
the size of a region by including the regional area as an explanatory variable in our specifica-
tion and denote it as Ai. The regional characteristics enter equation (1) through the terms
ci and ct as follows:
ci = ρ1Ai + ρ2Ri + c˜i
ct = δ1St + δ2Et + c˜t
where the ρ and δ are the parameters associated to the corresponding variables and c˜i and
c˜t are remaining unobserved region and time effects respectively. Substituting the terms
determining ci and ct to equation (1) leads to the augmented empirical specification that we
estimate:
lnIit = c0 + β1lnIi,t−1 + β2lnOit + β3ln
(
Yit
Nit
)
+ β4lnNit + β5lnPi,t−1
+ β6lnVit + ρ1Ai + ρ2Ri + δ1St + δ2Et + c˜i + c˜t + eit
(2)
It is important to note that in equation (2) only one out of the three political variables vary
by region (lnPi,t−1). The years remaining to election and the single-party dummy are in
national scale and vary over time but are constant across regions. As the variable lnPi,t−1
is the only one that takes into account regional political differences, we expect that this
variable should be more significant regarding the allocation decisions than the other two
political factors.
As discussed in Section 5, the investment allocation decisions of Iit are assumed to be
made jointly with that of lnOit. As this joint decision creates endogeneity concerns, we
instrument lnOit with its lagged value, lnOit−1, and estimate the model with two-stage least
squares with region specific fixed effects (IV-FE).15,16 The instrument is chosen to be the
lagged value of the endogenous variable in order to preserve comparability with the results
15See Greene (2012) for the details of instrumental variable (IV) estimation.
16The IV-FE estimation is made using the xtivreg2 command in stata developed by Schaffer (2005).
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of the other two models, where lagged levels and/or differences are used as instruments as
another source of endogeneity is the presence of the lagged dependent variable. In order
to account for this endogeneity, we estimate equation (2) also with the Arellano and Bond
(1991a) estimator and the Arellano and Bond (1991b)/Blundell and Bond (1998) estimator,
also called Difference GMM (Diff-GMM) and System GMM (Sys-GMM) respectively.17 The
variable lnOi,t−1 is again treated as an endogenous variable in the GMM estimations, but this
time instrumented in GMM fashion as discussed in Arellano and Bond (1991a,b); Blundell
and Bond (1998); Roodman (2009). Finally, in the GMM estimations, we include lagged
industrial electricity consumption per capita, Ki,t−1, as an IV style instrument. The results
are reported in Table 2. Year dummies are included in all estimations.
6 Data and Descriptive Statistics
By the time this study was finalized, a province level (NUTS 3) GDP series existed for
Turkey between 1987 and 2001. Separately, a regional level (NUTS 2) GVA series existed
for the years between 2004 and 2011. There was no sub-national output data for 2002 and
2003. However, these two series were presented as part of one single regional GVA series for
the period 1995-2006 by EUROSTAT until the second half of 2011, and by OECD Stat until
March 2013.18 We constructed a unique regional GVA series for Turkey to be used in this
study. After aggregating all the data to NUTS 2 level and deflating the figures such that all
are in 1998 prices, we imputed the missing years and expressed the entire series in terms of
GVA. As a result we obtained a regional GVA series for each 26 NUTS 2 regions of Turkey
for the period between 1987 through 2011.19
The descriptive statistics of the variables used for the estimations and and in the construc-
tion of the infrastructure index are shown in table 1. All variables that enter the estimations,
17The GMM estimations have been done in STATA 13 by using the xtabond2 command developed by Roodman (2009).
18The figures for the years 2002 and 2003 were accurately blank. Both institutes removed this data upon our notification that
the two series could not be treated as one. We would like to thank the officials at TURKSTAT for confirming this situation,
and to officials from EUROSTAT and OECD Stat for removing the previously published data.
19Appendix A.1 presents the modifications done to generate a complete regional GVA series for the range 1987-2011. We
are aware of at least one study published in a peer reviewed journal, using regional output data for Turkey for the period
1992-2006, with no mention to this issue.
16
except Ai and Ri are time variant. Most of our sample covers a period of a national single-
party government.20 In order control for the possibility of a different general investment
policy compared to the coalition party years, we include a dummy variable for the single
party period. As mentioned in Section 5, this corresponds to 2003 onwards.21
Tables A.5 to A.9 compare for each of the five economically largest regions the public
investment flows in transportation and communication to the percentage changes in the in-
frastructure index G, road, highway, railroad lengths, and the air passenger capacities for
the years 1999 through 2011.22 For land transportation infrastructure indicators, negative
percentage changes are present. This is can be due to the high importance that the govern-
ment has placed on this type of infrastructure in the last decade resulting in road distances
to shorten in some cases. Such cases are often pointed out in the reports by relevant govern-
ment sources. Some examples of roads that decreased in length during the last decade and
their amounts of decrease as documented by governmental sources are Adyaman - Ankara
(50 km)23, Artvin - Erzurum (24 Km)24, Black Sea Coastal Road (17 km)25, and a 1.5 km
decrease in distance due to opening of new tunnels on the Antalya-Kemer-Tekirova road.26
These tables also show that there are years where the stock measurements included in our
data are non-responsive to monetary investment. This could be due to the fact that stock
variables measure infrastructural attributes such as length and capacity while the monetary
investment figures measure additional attributes that are not reflected on the measurement
of stock. These are expenditures such as maintenance and repairs, IT updates, re-ordering,
modernization, and reinforcement of previously built infrastructure as specified in the rele-
20November 2002 onwards. The single party at this period was not a member of the preceding coalition government.
21Because the elections which started the single-party period were late in 2002 (November 3), we do not consider this year to
be within the single-party period.
22There are some figures that stand out in Tables A.7 and A.8 which are associated to the following reasons: in Bursa, a
construction investment for a 190 km “High standard railroad” between Bandirma, Bursa, and Bilecik was done in 2009
(Devlet Planlama Teskilati, a), while in Ankara, investment for a high-speed train between Ankara and Konya was made in
2009 (Devlet Planlama Teskilati, a), and investments were made for multiple railroad constructions from Ankara to many
other destinations in 2010 (Devlet Planlama Teskilati, b).
23Governorship of Adyaman, retrieved on 3-10-2012 from http://www.adiyaman.gov.tr/ortak_icerik/adiyaman.icisleri/
dosyalar/devam_edenY1.pdf.
24Governorship of Artvin, retrieved on 3-10-2012 from http://www.artvin.gov.tr/index.php?page=haber&file=detay&id=
9700.
25Republic of Turkey, Ministry of Transport, Maritime Affairs and Communications (2012). Retrieved on 3-10-2012 from
http://www2.tbmm.gov.tr/d24/7/7-4158sgc.pdf.
26Republic of Turkey, Ministry of Transport, Maritime Affairs and Communications. Retrieved on 3-10-2012 fromhttp://www.
kgm.gov.tr/Sayfalar/KGM/SiteEng/Root/MainPageEnglish.aspx.
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vant governmental database.27 Nevertheless, the amount of infrastructure measured in stock
still needs to be included in our estimations as investment flows can be expected to depend,
to a certain degree, on the existing size of infrastructure in a region as discussed in Section 5.
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Iit 37522816 87231458.91 225310.2 711365696
Oit 87802644.13 66317566.11 1508900 406984544
GVA 3025344114.84 4076647565.64 442062336 27436367872
Nit 2707646.58 1981422.14 732790 13255685
Pit 0.64 0.15 0.24 0.93
Vit 349.56 410.37 25 2737
Ai 29.6 12.06 5.2 59.66
Ri 54.72 39.6 1.17 118.26
St 0.69 0.46 0 1
Et 1.46 1.28 0 4
Kit 0.92 0.88 0.03 3.93
Git 7.04 2.44 4 12.22
Infrastructure index variables
Road density 84.08 14.94 53.49 119.67
Hway density 5.26 11.6 0 59.85
Railway density 13.16 8.15 0 40.41
Air transport capacity 3470355.03 5912765.84 0 28500000
Pub. Pier 1459.38 1955.74 0 5951
ADSL 111.81 67.18 35 353
N 338
The public investment data of SPO that we use in this study was modified as follows: a
currency change in Turkey which “erased six zeros” from the Turkish Lira in the mid 2000’s
was accounted for. Moreover, in the original source, this data is in provincial level. We
aggregated this data to NUTS 2 level. Public investments that are directed to more than
27The database of the Republic of Turkey, Ministry of Development (2012). Retrieved on 3-10-2012 from under http://www2.
dpt.gov.tr/kamuyat/il.html.
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one province were not recorded in the original data provided by the SPO. However, these
“missing” figures were reported under a “Multifarious Provinces” classification for each year
where individual projects and the specific locations where investments are directed were pro-
vided. As an exploratory exercise, for attaining more precise figures, we have transformed
the data by distributing these investments to “multifarious provinces” into the corresponding
provinces following a tedious data cleaning process for the three most populous provinces
of Turkey. We observed that the transformed data compared to the original version caused
roughly an upward shift of the trend lines of public investments in transportation and com-
munication. Based on this observation, for each year in the sample, we distributed these
“multifarious investments” to all regions by inflating the province specific investments by
the ratio of the amounts that were not reported as region-specific.28
7 Empirical results
Beginning by looking at the coefficient of our main variable of interest, Pit, we observe
that all three estimation methods find a significant impact of the political affinity of the re-
gions to the central government on the amount of public in investments in transportation and
communication they receive. This result is the main finding of our study: regions that have
a higher share total MP’s in the government party have received higher transportation and
communication investments, while those with less political affinity to the government party
received less investments in this category of infrastructure through 1999 and 2011. We con-
clude that political effects cause bias in the allocation of this type of regional infrastructure
in Turkey.
The results of all three estimation results suggest that dynamic effects are present in the
regional public investment flows: previous investments have a “spillover” effect to the current
period. This result is robust throughout our models and is supported by the AR1 test results
from the difference and system GMM results in the second and third columns respectively.
As discussed in Section 5, continuity of regional investment policies and the interrelatedness
28The details of this process are presented in Appendix A.2.
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of investment flows in consecutive periods may give rise to this result. On the other hand,
the other types of public investments a region receives does not have a significant coefficient.
But the consistent negative sign that it has in the results from all our models may hint at a
substitution effect rather than a complementary one.
All our models provide evidence that the higher the efficiency (per capita output) of a
region is, the higher are investments in transportation and communication, especially based
on the IV-FE results. However, this effect diminishes both in magnitude and significance
as the endogeneity posed by the lagged dependent variable is taken into account in the
GMM models at columns 2 and 3. Similarly, population has a strong and significant impact
according to the IV results, but the difference and system GMM estimations yield smaller
coefficients (and in the case of the difference-GMM results, an insignificant coefficient).
According to the system-GMM estimation, a 1 per cent increase in population increases
investments by around 0.7 per cent while the predicted approximate increase in investment
as a response to a 1 per cent increase in per capita output is about 1.1 per cent (significant
only in 10% level). However, the coefficients of ln(GV Ait/Nit) are higher in the first two
columns than those of lnNit, and in the case of the difference-GMM results, they have
higher significance. Therefore, our results imply a lack of clear emphasis on either equality
or equity of regions by the Turkish government; even though both output efficiency and
regional population seem to affect investments positively, we do not observe conclusive robust
evidence regarding their relative importance in allocation decisions.
Out of the other two political variables, only St yields a significant coefficient: the System-
GMM results suggest that there have been more country-wide public investments in trans-
portation and communication made during the singly party period.
We do not observe strong evidence that the existing infrastructure in a region is a deter-
minant of transportation and communication investment allocation decisions in Turkey. The
IV-FE model gives some evidence that the effect is negative. This would mean that regions
with less infrastructure receive higher infrastructure investment. However, this result is not
supported by the GMM estimations in terms of significance but is reinforced only in terms
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of direction. Similarly, congestion does not seem to play a role in the allocation decisions.
Finally, geography is not a determinant of the allocation decisions according to our results:
neither the size or the hilliness of a region have significant coefficients.
Table 2: Estimation Results for Equation (10)
(1) (2) (3)
IV-FE Diff-GMM Sys-GMM
lnIi,t-1 0.369
∗∗∗ 0.324∗∗∗ 0.465∗∗∗
(0.0632) (0.115) (0.134)
lnOit -0.0780 -0.0718 -0.102
(0.140) (0.191) (0.163)
ln(GVAit/Nit) 3.164
∗∗∗ 2.247∗ 1.116∗
(0.741) (1.180) (0.632)
lnNit 2.548
∗∗∗ 1.904 0.714∗∗
(0.900) (2.309) (0.289)
lnPi,t-1 0.686
∗∗∗ 1.136∗∗ 0.720∗∗
(0.180) (0.448) (0.324)
Git -0.418
∗ 0.256 0.0153
(0.244) (0.427) (0.0488)
ln(Vit/Nit) 0.318 0.130 -0.609
(0.457) (0.616) (0.430)
St -0.173 0.320 1.268
∗∗∗
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(0.551) (0.705) (0.230)
Et 0.00899 -0.0669 -0.244
(0.156) (0.137) (0.150)
Ai 0.00810
(0.00850)
Ri -0.000181
(0.00216)
Constant -13.74
(8.868)
Observations 312 286 312
Number of regions 26 26 26
observations per region 12 11 12
Number of instruments 1 21 26
GMM lag limits (1,2) (1,2)
Endogenous variable(s) ln(Other PI)it ln(I)i,t-1, ln(Other PI)it ln(I)i,t-1, ln(Other PI)it
AR1 test (p-value) 0.000461 0.000287
AR2 test (p-value) 0.713 0.877
Hansen test (p-value) 0.499 0.214
Sargan test (p-value) 0.596 0.130
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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8 Concluding Discussion
The main outcome of this study is the observed strong evidence that political bias has
been present in the allocation decisions of regional transportation and communication in-
vestments in Turkey through 1999 and 2011. Strikingly, no other explanatory variable in
our empirical model demonstrates such a clear and persistent effect on the regional allo-
cation of transportation and communication infrastructure. Elaborating on this result by
considering the various economic benefits presented by this types of infrastructure, which
are documented in the literature and reviewed in this study, we argue that the regional
allocation of transportation and communication infrastructure in Turkey is not optimally
conducted. Therefore, a diversion of regional policies from their goals and a lower level of
welfare, not only for regions, but also for the national economy as a whole can be expected
to result from such a biased allocation process. The main policy recommendation resulting
from this study is to remove the political effects from this decision-making process in the
favor of concentrating only to national economic goals such as the efficiency or equity of
regions, or focusing on regions lagging in terms of transportation and communication infras-
tructure. In the context of a possible dependence between infrastructure types, investments
in transportation and communication was assumed to share the same government resource
constraint with other types of investments in our analyses. However, no evidence for the
complementability or substitutabilty between these infrastructure categories was observed.
Regarding the distinction between efficiency and equity concerns of the government, the
results are inconclusive; there is not a clear emphasis placed by the government on regional
population or regional per capita output. Finally, we also observe evidence that significantly
higher investments in transportation and communication has been made nationwide during
the single-party period.
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A Appendix
Table A.1. Region Codes and Names
TR10: Istanbul
TR21: Tekirdag, Edirne, Kirklareli
TR22: Balikesir, Canakkale
TR31: Izmir
TR32: Aydin, Denizli, Mugla
TR33: Manisa, Afyon, Kutahya, Usak
TR41: Bursa, Eskisehir, Bilecik
TR42: Kocaeli, Sakarya, Duzce, Bilecik
TR51: Ankara
TR52: Konya, Karaman
TR61: Antalya, Isparta, Burdur
TR62: Adana, Mersin
TR63: Hatay, Kahramanmaras, Osmaniye
TR71: Kirikkale, Aksaray, Nigde,
TR72: Kayseri, Sivas, Yozgat
TR81: Zonguldak, Karabuk, Bartin
TR82: Kastamonu, Cankiri, Sinop
TR83: Samsun, Tokat, Corum, Amasya
TR90: Trabzon, Ordu, Giresun, Rize
TRA1: Erzurum, Erzincan, Bayburt
TRA2: Agri, Kars, Igdir, Ardahan
TRB1: Malatya, Elazig, Bingol, Tunceli
TRB2: Van, Mus, Bitlis, Hakkari
TRC1: Gaziantep, Adiyaman, Kilis
TRC2: Sanliurfa, Diyarbakir
TRC3: Mardin, Batman, Sirnak, Siirt
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Table A.2. Measurement of political affiliation in other studies
Author Title Measurement
Cadot et al. (1999) A Political Economy Model of Infrastructure Al-
location: An Empirical Assessment
Dummy equal to 1 when the majority in a regional coun-
cil and that of the national parliament are either both
right-wing or both left-wing.
Costa-I-Font et al. (2003) Political competition and pork-barrel politics in
the allocation of public investment in Mexico
The share of votes in the municipalities received by the
governing party in each state, A dummy variable for
states governed by a political party different from the
governing party.
Castells and Sole-Olle (2005) The regional allocation of infrastructure invest-
ment: The role of equity, efficiency and political
factors
Numerous variables constructed from data on election re-
sults, election system, and other political characteristics.
More´ and Olle´ (2005) Does decentralization improve the efficiency in the
allocation of public investment? Evidence from
Spain
The incumbent party’s vote share in the last election.
Kemmerling and Bodenstein (2006) Partisan Politics in Regional Redistribution Do
Parties Affect the Distribution of EU Structural
Funds across Regions?
Size of the left and eurosceptic parties.
25
Table A.2. Variable Measurement of political affiliation in other studies (cont’d)
Author Title Measurement
Sole-Olle and Sorribas-Navarro (2008) The effects of partisan alignment on the alloca-
tion of intergovernmental transfers. Differences-
in-differences estimates for Spain
The relative policital position of the grant receiving gov-
ernment (partner, leader, etc. of the upper and lower
level governments) or the difference between the vote
share of the party in government and the vote share of
the second party.
Mizutani and Tanaka (2008) Productivity effects and determinants of public in-
frastructure investment
Ratio of majority vote to minority vote in the House of
Representatives, or percentage of votes for the gov’t party
in the prefectureal congress (depending on the investment
source).
Zheng et al. (2013) Central government’s infrastructure investment
across Chinese regions: A dynamic spatial panel
data approach
Number of committee members (or candidates) each
province has in the Central Committee of the Communist
Party of China.
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Table A.3: Variable Definitions
Name Year Coverage Description
Iit 1999-2011 Public investments in transportation and
communication deflated to 1998 prices (na-
tional currency). Inflated to account for
the missing amounts due to the ”Various
Provinces” classification. Source: Republic
of Turkey, Ministry of Development.
Oit 1999-2011 Public investments in areas other than trans-
portation and communication deflated to
1998 prices (national currency). Inflated to
account for the missing amounts due to the
”Various Provinces” classification. Source:
Republic of Turkey, Ministry of Develop-
ment.
Pit 1999-2011 Number of members of parliament (MP) in
the government from the region divided by
the lagged total number of MP’s allocated
to the region. Source for the base variables:
Turkish Statistical Institute (Turkstat).
St 1999-2011 Dummy variable that equals one if a single
party government was in power, and equals
zero if a coalition government was in power.
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Table A.3: Variable Definitions (cont’d)
Name Year Coverage Description
Yit 1987-2011 Regional Gross value added in 1998 prices
(national currency). Source: Turkstat. Mod-
ified as specified in Appendix A.
Nit 1990-2011 Population. Source: OECD Stat.
Ri Constant Elevation of the highest provincial center
of the region minus that of the lowest, di-
vided by regional area. The elevations of the
provincial centers in each region has been
obtained using the Google Earth software
search box. Source: Google Earth 7.0.3.8542.
Ai Constant Area in 1000 square meters, excluding lakes.
Source: Turkstat.
Vit 1990-2011 Total number of vehicles except trailers or
tractors. Source: Eurostat.
Et 1999-2011 The number of years remaining to a year in
which elections took place. Takes the value
of zero if a given year is an election year.
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Table A.3: Variable Definitions (cont’d)
Name Year Coverage Description
Kit 1995-2011 Electricity consumption by industrial estab-
lishments (MWh). Source: Turkish Statisti-
cal Institute. Divided by population. Only
used as an instrument in the estimations.
Git 1995-2011 Index of transportation and communication
infrastructure stock constructed using the
first principal components of the variables ln
Road density, ln Hway density, ln Railway
density, ln total length of public piers, ln Air
transport capacity.
Road densityit 1995-2011 Provincial road length (km). Source: Turk-
stat. Divided by Area.
Hway densityit 1995-2011 Highway length (km). Source: Turkstat. Di-
vided by Area.
Railroad densityit 1995-2011 Railroad length (km). Source: Turkstat. Di-
vided by Area.
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Table A.3: Variable Definitions (cont’d)
Name Year Coverage Description
Air capacityit 1987-2011 Total passenger capacity in the regional air-
ports. Compiled from the information on
area and establishment dates available at the
airport interactive map at the website of the
Republic of Turkey: Ministry of Transport,
Maritime Affairs and Communication.
Pub. pieri as of 2005 (constant) Total public pier length (m). Source Re-
public of Turkey - Ministry of Transport,
Maritime Affairs and Communication ”1995
- 2005 Ulatrma ve Haberleme”, Ankara 2005.
ADSLi as of 2006 (constant) Table Number of ADSL lines in the PTT of-
fices. Source: Republic of Turkey - General
Directorate of PTT.
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Table A.4. Some Examples of Factors Considered in Previous Studies for the Determinants of the Allocation of Public Investment
Author Title Sample Dependent variable Considered factors
Cadot et al. (1999) A Political Economy Model of In-
frastructure Allocation: An Empir-
ical Assessment
21 French regions Investment in trans-
portation infrastruc-
ture
Labor productivity, stock of transporta-
tion infrastructure, number of large estab-
lishements, taxes, political affiliation, loca-
tion dummies.
Costa-I-Font et al. (2003) Political competition and pork-
barrel politics in the allocation of
public investment in Mexico
32 Mexican federal
units
Public investment
per capita
Political Affiliation, relative income, popu-
lation share, education, urbanization, po-
litical affinity, resource abundance.
Castells and Sole-Olle (2005) The regional allocation of infras-
tructure investment: The role of eq-
uity, efficiency and political factors
50 Spanish regions Transportation in-
vestment by the
central government
divided by the pre-
vious year’s capital
stock
Lagged dependent variable, output
growth, population growth, trucks, land
vehicles, rail transport, maritime trans-
port, air transport, income, debt, political
affinity.
More´ and Olle´ (2005) Does decentralization improve the
efficiency in the allocation of public
investment? Evidence from Spain
44 Spanish regions Investment in roads Lagged dependent variable, decentraliza-
tion, growth of output, no. of vehicles, ve-
hicle usage, political affinity.
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Table A.4. Some Examples of Factors Considered in Previous Studies for the Determinants of the Allocation of Public Investment (cont’d)
Author Title Sample Dependent variable Considered factors
Kemmerling and Bodenstein (2006) Partisan Politics in Regional Redis-
tribution Do Parties Affect the Dis-
tribution of EU Structural Funds
across Regions?
116 EU regions EU structural funds
per capita
Per capita GDP, unemployment, agricul-
tural shares, effective number of parties,
presence of federalist systems, political
affinity.
Sole-Olle and Sorribas-Navarro (2008) The effects of partisan alignment on
the allocation of intergovernmental
transfers. Differences-in-differences
estimates for Spain
869 local Spanish
governments
Grants received per
capita
Political affinity, debt burden, population,
property value per capita, property tax
rate.
Mizutani and Tanaka (2008) Productivity effects and determi-
nants of public infrastructure in-
vestment
46 Japanese prefec-
tures
Public capital invest-
ment
Private sector output, previous stock of
public capital, employment indicators, po-
litical influence, population density, fiscal
balance, gov’t grants.
Zheng et al. (2013) Central government’s infrastruc-
ture investment across Chinese re-
gions: A dynamic spatial panel
data approach
31 Chinese provinces Infrastructure invest-
ment made by the
central government
Lagged dependent variable, spatially
lagged dependent variable, GDP
(quadratic), political affinity, road in-
frastructure, railroad infrastructure.
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Table A.5: Correspondence of infrastructure investment and changes infrastructure stock
TR10: Istanbul
Year TPI % ∆ G % ∆ Road
length
% ∆
Highway
length
% ∆
Railway
length
% ∆
Airport
capacity
1999 384797376.0 0 -0.1658375 0 0 0
2000 382969824.0 0 0 0 0 0
2001 167828656.0 -0.0574539 -0.4983389 0 0 14
2002 213587648.0 -0.4102019 -10.35058 0 0 0
2003 257194000.0 0.2213662 -2.793296 7.612457 0 0
2004 236313232.0 -0.0238267 2.490422 -2.572347 0 0
2005 354826336.0 -0.4317256 -10.84112 0 0 0
2006 430711040.0 -0.6652262 -16.14256 0 0 0
2007 500065440.0 0 0 0 0 0
2008 566248384.0 -0.1564413 -0.25 0 -5.238095 0
2009 647192448.0 0 0 0 0 0
2010 711365696.0 0.9425969 28.07018 0 0 0
Table A.6: Correspondence of infrastructure investment and changes infrastructure stock
TR31: Izmir
Year TPI % ∆ G % ∆ Road
length
% ∆
Highway
length
% ∆
Railway
length
% ∆
Airport
capacity
1999 126816936.0 0 -0.962963 2.923977 0 0
2000 67156928.0 0.0137332 -1.570681 1.704545 0 0
2001 63317432.0 0 0 0 0 0
2002 70885456.0 0.0891208 -0.987842 2.793296 0 0
2003 107371784.0 0.3773066 -0.5372218 3.26087 8.695652 0
2004 91823424.0 0.0483963 1.774691 -0.5263158 0 0
2005 75945392.0 -0.0221887 -0.5307051 0 0 0
2006 57746812.0 0.2745712 0.152439 5.820106 0 0
2007 18143602.0 0 0 0 0 0
2008 29777156.0 0.169755 -1.674277 4 1.846154 0
2009 57994792.0 0.0162951 -0.1547988 .4807692 0 0
2010 49172868.0 -0.0128944 -0.3100775 0 0 0
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Table A.7: Correspondence of infrastructure investment and changes infrastructure stock
TR41: Bursa
Year TPI % ∆ G % ∆ Road
length
% ∆
Highway
length
% ∆
Railway
length
% ∆
Airport
capacity
1999 19747866.0 0 -1.325052 0 9.118541 0
2000 119625496.0 -0.9927337 0 0 0 750
2001 59517364.0 -0.0074947 -0.1258917 0 0 0
2002 43827840.0 0 0 0 0 0
2003 104561104.0 -0.0125159 -0.210084 0 0 0
2004 133385976.0 3.810494 -0.0421053 0 0 0
2005 92055936.0 -0.0048307 -0.084246 0 0 0
2006 97656920.0 4.53861 0 225 0 0
2007 57448380.0 0 0 0 0 0
2008 59269704.0 -0.1369844 0.2107926 0 -3.899721 0
2009 50056440.0 1.910984 .4627682 0 64.34782 0
2010 65583524.0 0.7201613 1.675042 13.84615 .8818342 0
Table A.8: Correspondence of infrastructure investment and changes infrastructure stock
TR51: Ankara
Year TPI % ∆ G % ∆ Road
length
% ∆
Highway
length
% ∆
Railway
length
% ∆
Airport
capacity
1999 16989698.0 0 2.672467 0 1.973684 0
2000 19805366.0 -0.0787801 -0.968523 0 0 0
2001 12619823.0 -0.5572711 -0.3667482 -5.882353 0 0
2002 150107392.0 0.0448568 0.5521472 0 0 0
2003 13581354.0 0.3077955 -0.0610128 3.645833 0 0
2004 10192342.0 -0.0637925 -0.2442002 -0.5025126 0 0
2005 18341684.0 0.0099385 0.122399 0 0 0
2006 11244385.0 0 0 0 0 0
2007 11763313.0 -0.0498027 -0.6112469 0 0 0
2008 13571400.0 -0.0150068 -0.1845018 0 0 0
2009 15077028.0 2.412661 0.6161429 0 52.25806 0
2010 14717430.0 1.941078 1.592162 0 38.34746 0
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Table A.9: Correspondence of infrastructure investment and changes infrastructure stock
TR42: Kocaeli
Year TPI % ∆ G % ∆ Road
length
% ∆
Highway
length
% ∆
Railway
length
% ∆
Airport
capacity
1999 22721532.0 0 -0.7407407 0 8.264462 0
2000 37998184.0 -0.1056419 0.39801 0 -4.198473 0
2001 25127580.0 -0.006224 -0.148662 0 0 0
2002 5258311.5 -0.07326 -1.736973 0 0 0
2003 8329263.0 -0.1528016 -3.585859 0 0 0
2004 16884820.0 0.0177367 -0.3143007 .6535948 0 0
2005 39677976.0 0 0 0 0 0
2006 25727916.0 0.3315606 -0.262743 7.467533 0 0
2007 13138195.0 -0.0021968 -0.052687 0 0 0
2008 23087934.0 0.0361985 -0.2108593 0 1.593626 0
2009 14432585.0 -0.0132495 -0.3169572 0 0 0
2010 20988992.0 0.0154567 0.3709592 0 0 0
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Figure A.1. The NUTS-2 level regions of Turkey.
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Figure A.2. Spatial distribution of infrastructure stock
(a) 1999
(b) 2011
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Figure A.3. Spatial distribution of gross value added
(a) 1999
(b) 2011
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Figure A.4. Spatial distribution of public investments in transportation and communication
(a) 1999
(b) 2011
A.1 Gross value added data adjustments
As earlier mentioned, the output indicators for Turkish regions do not follow a comparable
structure for the data range used in this study. Therefore, we modified the available data as
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such: first, the province level data was aggregated so that the spatial units would correspond
to NUTS2 regions. Next, the series was deflated to 1998 constant national currency. The
output series which is in terms of GDP for 1987-2001 and in terms of GVA for 2004-2011
(thus, with a two-year gap) is labeled as R Output, the national GDP series for Turkey as
a whole for the whole range is labeled as N Output, a dummy variable that takes the value
of one if the year is between 2004-2011 (ie. if the measured regional output is in terms of
GVA), is labeled as GVAdum,
In order to express all the series in terms of GVA, for each region, the below pooled OLS
regression was estimated for the years in the sample before 2004:
ln(R Output)t = β0 + β1ln(N Output)t + β2GVAdumt + t (3)
Using the parameter estimates from equation (3), ln regional GVA (lnRGV At) in constant
1998 currency was predicted. Finally, the already existing regional GVA figures for 2004-2011
were merged into this predicted series. As a result, a reconciled and interpolated regional
NUTS2 GVA series for 1987-2011 has been available for the analyses conducted in this study.
A.2 Public investments data adjustments
Data on public investments were available in provincial level (NUTS3) for 1999-2011. As
for the GVA adjustments, the provincial data has been first aggregated to regional (NUTS2)
scale. The original source reports provincial data only if all investment has been directed
within the province; if investment was directed to more than one province (for example a
road connecting two or more provinces, this investment did not appear within the category
of the provinces. However, such investments are reported under a “Multifarious Provinces”
category, where the investment and the directed provinces is explained in detail. For three
large provinces, Istanbul, Izmir, and Ankara, we have distributed such investments by hand
from the “Multifarious Provinces” category to the three provinces. When investments were
specified as directed to more than one province, we weighted all those provinces equally
when distributing the investment figures, as it is impossible to know how the investment was
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shared between them. As a result, we were able to compare the original data to our modified
data for three major provinces. Transportation and communication investment trend lines
for each province were shifted upwards, mostly following very similar trends, as can be seen
in the below graph.
Figure A.5: Comparison of original and modified data
(a) Istanbul (b) Izmir
(c) Ankara
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Therefore, upon deflating all investment figures to 1998 prices in national currency using
the GDP deflator for 1998, we have made an assumption that is possible to inflate each
provinces investment figures by the recorded figures times the ratio of the missing investment
ratio for each year. The details of this modification are as follows:
If we call the
– transportation and communication investments that are summed from available provin-
cial data Recorded TPI,
– reported aggregate country investments in transportation and communication, where
no investment figure is missing, Aggregate TPI, and
– the originally available provincial investment data OTPI,
and if for each year,
– Aggregate TPI Recorded TPI = Missing TPI , ie. those that are not showing up under
provincial categories but are “hidden” under “Multifarious Provinces,” and
– Missing Ratio = Missing TPI / Recorded TPI,
then for each region, the investment figures used in this study, TPI, equals:
OTPI +OTPI ×MissingRatio
The resulting regional figures add up to the officially reported total country aggregate in-
vestment in transportation and communication for each year.
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